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The Background, Rationale, and Success
of Chilean Economic Policy
ROBERTO ZAHLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
My talk will begin with a broad, but brief, introduction regard-
ing the situation in Latin America today to provide a framework
for a discussion about recent Chilean economic policy. I will then
address some general issues on Chilean economic policy. Finally, I
will focus on the specific role of the Central Bank of Chile within
this economic policy.
II. STRUCTURAL REFORM AND ADJUSTMENT IN
LATIN AMERICA
Nearly eleven years ago, in August of 1982, the Latin-Ameri-
can debt crisis began. Mexico was not able to pay the interest it
owed to its creditor banks. Along with Mexico, almost in a domino
effect, most Latin-American countries suffered the same situation.
In my view, it is very important to determine the origins of the debt
crisis because we need to avoid the possibility that history will re-
peat itself. The origins of that crisis are evident in two sources: (1)
domestic mistakes made by countries in their internal economic
policy; and (2) mistakes made by commercial international banks
in their assessment of the risk for loans made to Latin-American
countries. The latter element is directly related to the Oil Shock of
1973, when oil-producing countries received huge revenues out of
increases in the price of oil. The oil-producing countries could not
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absorb all of the revenues in foreign currencies within their own
economies, so they had to be recycled. These resources were re-
cycled in a very specific way. Most of them were deposited in in-
ternational banks. The banks, in turn, increased their exposure in
developing countries, particularly in Latin America, but without
adequate analysis of risk conditions. This was perhaps the first
time in many, many years-at least in this century-that banks
made loans to countries for general balance of payments purposes
and not for purposes of financing foreign trade or specific projects.
As a result of the debt crisis, net capital inflows to the region
became negative, and most countries were not able to pay the in-
terest on their debt, not to mention the amortization of that debt.
Therefore, most Latin-American countries had to face a lack of
foreign exchange and engage in profound adjustment policies in
order to conform with International Monetary Fund and World
Bank recommendations for restructuring their economies and eco-
nomic policy. Because of the debt crisis, the 1980s are considered
to be a "lost decade" for most of Latin America. The Latin-Amer-
ican nations slipped into a recession. As a result, investment, out-
put, and wages fell dramatically; high unemployment and
accelerated inflation were the norm rather than the exception; and
almost every economic indicator for Latin America reflected poor
performance.
Today, however, there is a new wave of optimism throughout
most of Latin America because growth has, once again, resumed.
In 1991 and 1992, growth averaged 3% per year. Thus, it is safe to
say that the general mood of optimism throughout the region is
well-founded. First, in most countries, there is a general trend to-
wards more democratic, participative, and open political societies.
Second, there have been major improvements in macroeconomic
policy design and implementation. Third, regarding micro-
economic issues, enterprises have been modernized and their feasi-
bility increased in order to enable them to compete abroad with
other countries presently involved in international competition. Fi-
nally, and perhaps most importantly, there is a movement through-
out the region towards the implementation and/or acceleration of
major reforms in the areas of tax, finance, and social security. Fur-
ther reforms have occurred in the commercial area by reducing
barriers to trade, lowering and homogenizing import tariffs by en-
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suring real and stable exchange rates, and gradually removing re-
strictions on international capital flows.
Each of these elements is a conference subject in itself. The
point I would like to emphasize, however, is that there is a wave of
optimism in Latin America emanating from these changes. The
Latin-American countries are realizing that they can and must play
a very important role in the design and implementation of eco-
nomic policy and that the responsibility for their future lies in their
own hands and not solely in those of the major industrialized coun-
tries. Although it may sound contradictory, this is completely con-
sistent with the realization of Latin-American countries that their
economic destiny is linked to the world economy because they are
opening their economies to trade and finance.
III. CHILEAN ECONOMIC POLICY
Chile has a small economy. With a population of 13.5 million
inhabitants, Chile's gross domestic product ("GDP") is approxi-
mately 40 billion dollars, and GDP per capita is about 3,000 dol-
lars. Chile's small economy places certain constraints on the way
in which it designs its development policy. This will be discussed in
detail later.
Given the events in the last twenty to thirty years, there are
two significant challenges for a country like Chile. The first chal-
lenge is to enter the twenty-first century with a society that strives
to accomplish the following: minimize its social conflicts; increase
its productivity and competitiveness; lengthen the time horizon for
economic agents, both national and foreign, regarding investment
decisions; and, in general, promote something that has not been
traditional in Chile-cooperation rather than confrontation. This
has not happened in the last thirty years, but I believe that because
of our recent experiences, in addition to what we have seen in
other Latin-American countries, it is reasonable to be optimistic
regarding this first challenge.
The second challenge is to combine a market economy with
stability, and economic growth with social development, in the
framework of an open, free, and democratic political system. The
combination of these three elements-market economy, social de-
velopment, and an open political system-has not been the tradi-
tion in Chile nor in Latin America generally. Here again, I think
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that the lesson learned from past experiences lends confidence to
the feeling that we can successfully face this challenge in the future.
A. Chile's Road to Success
There exists today certain structural elements in Chile which I
think are important to mention. Chile has a relatively educated
and qualified labor force. In order to successfully improve the
value added to our exports, we must allow for reallocation of la-
borers from certain sectors of the economy that lose competitive
advantages to other sectors of the economy that gain competitive
advantages in the process of the internationalization of the Chilean
economy. Nonetheless, when you compare our labor force with
that of other countries in Latin America, it is relatively well-
trained.
Chile has a generous endowment of natural resources, a mod-
em and sophisticated financial system, and high standards in all
areas of communications. Furthermore, our public institutions
have reduced bureaucracy and the civil service has high moral stan-
dards. These elements contribute to the grounded mood of opti-
mism in facing the challenges previously mentioned. Lastly, I
would reiterate that this optimism originates in the past exper-
iences of Chile and the rest of Latin America, and in the general
attitude of trying not to repeat the mistakes that we have made in
the past.
B. Maintaining Macroeconomic Equilibrium
One of the lessons learned from past mistakes, which relates
specifically to my position as President of the Central Bank, is the
high degree of consciousness in our country regarding the impor-
tance of maintaining what we call macroeconomic equilibrium.
This process basically involves controlling inflation, avoiding bal-
ance of payment crises, and ensuring minimum levels of employ-
ment for the population. It is quite impressive to observe the
conscious recognition of the importance of macroeconomic equilib-
rium on the part of the leaders of the intellectual and political sec-
tors in Chile, as well as the business communities and labor unions.
I would like to stress this consciousness because of the rather
abstract nature of macroeconomic equilibrium. It is the intangibil-
ity of this concept that would lead one to believe that very few
people or institutions are concerned with maintaining such equilib-
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rium. In spite of this, we do have a high regard for stability and
sound macroeconomic management. Perhaps this is because we
experienced extremely high levels of inflation in the early 1970s
and high unemployment in the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, coupled
with both past and present experiences of other countries in Latin
America-in terms of high inflation and balance of payment
problems. Maintenance of macroeconomic equilibrium is a neces-
sary condition for building a foundation for Chilean society, so that
it may develop in a reasonable and increasingly participatory man-
ner. In order to elaborate on some of the elements behind Chile's
economic policy, I will refer to four areas in which there is a na-
tional consensus.
1. The Role of the Private Sector
The first area of national consensus relates to the role of the
private sector in the economy. Today, there is a wide consensus
that the private sector-both national and foreign-is the main
force for development in the Chilean economy. This consensus
was not commonly held in the past. Foreign investment in Chile
today constitutes approximately 4% of its GDP, a very high rate on
a worldwide basis. This represents the international community's
confidence in the Chilean economy and its recognition that Chile's
legislation is nondiscriminatory and nondiscretionary toward for-
eign investment. At the same time, overall private investment has
increased substantially in recent years. In 1992, private investment
increased by 25% in real terms, and we expect this year's increase
to be above 15%. The Chilean economic policy should be built
around the central objective that the rate of investment growth
should exceed the rate of output growth. In other words, capital
accumulation, such as equipment and inventories, should exceed
overall aggregate output increases and should therefore be one of
the main sources of growth of the Chilean economy.
2. The Role of the Market Economy
The second area of national consensus has to do with the role
of the market economy. Again, this has been an area of great dis-
cussion in Chile and throughout Latin America in the past. Today,
the prominent philosophy is that free prices, determined a compet-
itive market, should be the norm and that the exceptions to this
should remain exactly that-exceptions. One major exception is
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minimum wages, which, for social considerations, are determined
by means of a non-market method. Another exception involves
interest and exchange rates, which are uncontrolled prices, and yet,
they are not entirely market-determined prices because of their im-
portance in the economic policy and development strategy of
Chile.
Interest rates are the main instrument through which the Cen-
tral Bank of Chile attempts to control aggregate demand and
reduce the rate of inflation. The latter is our main target. There-
fore, we influence interest rates in such a way as to try to have a
diminishing rate of inflation. At the same time, the exchange rate
is a crucial factor in determining resource allocation, division of
labor, and investment decisions between what we call tradeable
and non-tradeable goods sectors: those related to exports, imports,
and import substitution activities. This price, though not con-
trolled, is in a sense "filtered" by the Central Bank through its pol-
icy. This filtering occurs because we believe that the behavior
(time-path) of that price is crucial for resource allocation in the
Chilean economy.
The experience we had in the late 1970s, just before the for-
eign debt crisis, and the experience that some countries are now
undergoing by allowing the market to determine the exchange rate
predispose the economy to significant problems. For example,
there is a trend, especially for foreign creditors-be they foreign
direct investors, suppliers or creditors, private banks, or institu-
tional investors (such as pension funds)-to behave in a procyclical
way. These institutions tend to lend money to or invest in coun-
tries when the countries are, in relative terms, doing well and there
is less need for money from abroad. If a country like Chile, for
example, permitted this influx of resources into the country with-
out any filter or restrictions and allowed the exchange rate to be
market-determined, at some point the currency would appreciate
to such a degree that many exporters (and particularly many non-
traditional exporters, who are one of the main sources of growth of
the Chilean economy) would become less competitive in the world
markets. Once the same foreign creditors examine the current ac-
count of the balance of payments and see that it is deteriorating-
and it will deteriorate if the exchange rate depreciates-they will
send their profits, interest, capital, and amortization abroad. Yet,
this is the precise moment when foreign exchange problems are
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imminent and when there is a need for more foreign financing in
the country. Therefore, the exchange rate would fluctuate, giving
erroneous and misleading signs to investors in the tradeable sector.
This is something we try to avoid.
In general terms, the Chilean economy is quite vulnerable to
foreign shocks, such as a turnaround in the international prices of
some commodities, world interest rates, and/or the major foreign
creditors' perceptions of the country's creditworthiness. Therefore,
we need to follow-up that price in the economy. In Chile's case, we
have certain regulations that are designed to create a situation in
the balance of payments that is compatible with medium- and long-
term overall macroeconomic equilibrium in which the exchange
rate is not solely market-determined.
The interest rate is also not solely market-determined,
although the market certainly is a significant factor. This is the
case because the interest rate is one of the main instruments of
monetary policy used to achieve a stable and gradually decreasing
inflation.
3. Chile Should Be an Open Economy
The third element of national consensus is the belief that Chile
should be commercially and financially open, that is, an economy
that is increasingly integrated into the world economy. There are
several reasons for this belief. The first reason is the size of the
Chilean economy. Because the domestic market is small, we need
wider markets than the Chilean market alone to benefit from econ-
omies of scale and the division of labor. Experience shows that
lowering trade barriers and multilateral open markets play an im-
portant role in the substantial increase of Chilean exports. Second,
exports of goods represent approximately 25% of the Chilean
GDP and exports of goods and services represent around 35% of
the GDP. Therefore, for example, a 10% increase in exports alone
implies a 3% increase in output.
a. Trade
One example in this area is the export of copper, which tradi-
tionally amounted to more than 70% of total Chilean exports. To-
day, copper exports represent approximately one-third of total
exports, while other traditional exports, including other minerals,
fruit, fishmeal, and pulp, account for another one-third. The last
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third, which amounts to nearly 3.3 billion dollars of non-traditional
exports, includes a great variety of goods going to many different
markets. Examples of these non-traditional exports are wine,
salmon and other fresh fish, wood chips, fruit juice, and canned
foods. I emphasize that these latter exports represent nearly one-
third of total Chilean exports. This is one of the main elements
that characterizes Chile and distinguishes it from other countries.
We follow these exports because they are one of our main sources
of growth. In fact, although the world economy has not been very
buoyant in recent years, these exports have increased by an aver-
age of 20% every year during the last five years. Chilean exporters
have profited from this increase because the quantity of these ex-
ports is relatively small in absolute terms and does not threaten
domestic markets in more developed countries nor in Latin-Ameri-
can countries. Thus, it is likely that the export of these products
will continue to increase.
To explain what has happened with the exportable sector in
Chile, I will compare the year 1985 with 1992. In 1985, we ex-
ported to 99 countries; today we export to 131 countries. Further-
more, the number of exporters has increased from 2,300 in 1985 to
5,400 in 1992. The number of items that were exported increased
from 1,000 in 1985 to more than 3,400 in 1992, while the value of
exports increased from 3.8 billion dollars to 9.9 billion dollars. Ad-
ditionally, exports have diversified by region; Asia, Europe, Latin
America, and North America each receive approximately one-
third of our exports. Therefore, we have a diversified structure of
exports in both products and markets. This diversity is extremely
important because it provides the necessary stability to the process,
where exports are the main source of economic growth. The aver-
age annual rate of growth of non-copper exports has been approxi-
mately 15%, while non-traditional exports have increased even
more rapidly, doubling their share in the GDP between 1980 and
1990 from 9% to 18%.
b. Foreign Direct Investment
In addition to trade, the degree of consensus regarding the
openness of the Chilean economy also relates to foreign direct in-
vestment. In relation to other countries, Chile receives some of the
largest amounts of foreign direct investment, even though Chile
does not have the most liberal legislation in this regard. Until re-
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cently, foreign capital had to stay in Chile for at least three years
before it could be remitted abroad. Today, remittance is permitted
after one year and, as in many Latin-American countries, capital
can be repatriated in twenty-four hours. I believe, however, that
Chile should not adopt an extremely liberal policy, at least not sud-
denly or abruptly, for several reasons. First, we want a reasonable
degree of stability. Second, we want to be sure that these invest-
ments are really going to the production or service sector of the
economy and that they are not short-term capital that can easily
leave the country whenever the economy falters.
In recent years, Chile has gradually but consistently opened its
capital account to the world financial markets. For example, we
have authorized American Depository Receipts ("ADRs"). This
means that Chilean private corporations have successfully issued
shares that are traded on the New York Stock Exchange. The Cen-
tral Bank has been cautious with regard to companies entering into
this market, and is particularly concerned about the sequence and
amounts of foreign capital sought. More companies will follow the
path, but again within a clear-cut strategy. We do not want a flood
of money going to enterprises that might not meet our standards of
excellence and might tarnish Chile's name and even jeopardize
other companies' chances of obtaining financing from the interna-
tional capital markets at reasonable prices.
Chilean companies will soon begin issuing bonds abroad. This
is something no private Chilean company has done before. With
regard to ADRs' policy, we will be cautious because the Chilean
economy has relatively high interest rates. Many companies would
like to issue bonds abroad because they can get financing at lower
costs. Although that behavior may be rational for individual com-
panies, it could have negative macroeconomic implications for the
Chilean economy, including over-indebtedness, excess expendi-
ture, and overvaluation of the currency, all of which we attempt to
avoid.
Despite its success in the foreign sector, or really because of it,
Chile presently has no program with the International Monetary
Fund ("IMF"). Correspondingly, there is no balance of payments
problem that requires us to seek financial assistance from the IMF.
The price of Chilean debt in the secondary market-that is, the
debt that originated in the foreign debt crisis-is near its face value
and is one of the highest among medium-income countries. This
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indicates that the international community has confidence in the
way in which Chile is serving its foreign obligations. Therefore,
many of the debt-equity swap schemes that were important be-
tween 1985 and 1990 are almost nonexistent today, and investors
do not benefit from the debt-to-equity conversions. This is another
sign that the country's creditworthiness is improving. Additionally,
Chile has been the first Latin-American country to be rated as
what is called "investment grade" by Standard and Poor's. This
can be considered a "brand of quality," reducing the risk of invest-
ment in Chile.
Thus, it is safe to say that, from both trade and financial in-
vestment perspectives, it is important for Chile to have an increas-
ingly open economy. Yet, the speed, nature, and sequencing of
that openness must be cautiously designed and prudently imple-
mented to prevent huge movements in the exchange rate and/or
spending, which may destabilize the economy and create disrup-
tions, forcing Chile to engage in a go-and-stop-and-go policy.
4. The Role of the Public Sector
The fourth issue on which there is a large national consensus is
the role of the public sector. In principle, the share of public sector
spending in the GDP should not increase. In fact, government
spending has decreased from 34% in 1985 to less than 25% in 1992.
The role of the public sector in Chile has changed significantly in
comparison with its traditional role in Latin America.
Today, there is a general agreement that the public sector must
fulfill three functions. A very important function is the social role
of the public sector. Here, we refer to areas in which there is no
direct interest by the private sector and where social public spend-
ing, therefore, is required. This includes, for example, the poor,
education, nurseries, and healthcare. From an economist's per-
spective, this represents investment in human capital. It could also
be characterized as striving for a more stable and egalitarian soci-
ety. The state must give its under-privileged more opportunities
through this kind of social spending.
Besides being efficiently focalized on those most in need, this
particular kind of spending, as well as overall government spend-
ing, should be constrained by the kind of financing the government
can get in a "healthy" way. That is, the norm should be to work
within the funds derived from Parliament-approved taxation and
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not by getting indebted abroad or within. Two years ago, Chile
passed tax reform legislation that allowed the Chilean Government
to increase substantially its social expenditure. Thus, state social
spending in general is understood within the framework of main-
taining macroeconomic equilibrium.
The second function regarding the role of the state, or the
public sector, has to do with the regulatory function. This is ex-
tremely important in some areas related to the Central Bank. I am
referring to the financial system-specifically, to the whole issue of
supervision and regulatory aspects of banking and/or other institu-
tions, such as pension funds, where public faith is being deposited.
Regulation is also required in areas of natural monopolies, envi-
ronment, and in all those areas where property rights are poorly
defined, where there is sort of an explicit or implicit guarantee of
the state, or where there are some clear market imperfections that
require regulation by the government. This is an area that is rela-
tively unexplored and in which we have had little experience in
Chile. We are convinced, however, that smooth and proper func-
tioning of the market will require professional, technical, and
sound regulatory institutions to ensure timely prevention of market
failures through yellow lights and not through red lights once the
damage is done.
Finally, the third function relates specifically to
macroeconomic equilibrium, and it is here that the Central Bank
has a key role to play.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL BANK
Chile now has an independent central bank that functions as a
linear combination between the United States' Federal Reserve
System and Germany's Deutsche Bundesbank. The Central Bank
does not, at this stage, have the history of the Federal Reserve or
the Bundesbank, but it is similarly structured.
The Central Bank cannot finance the government, and does
not receive instructions from the government or from anyone else.
The Bank is, however, required to coordinate its policies with the
government as long as that coordination does not attempt to jeop-
ardize the Central Bank functions, which are to stabilize the value
of money and to ensure the normal due payment of foreign debt
and of external payments in general.
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In economic terms, the first objective means that we should
aim at lowering the rate of inflation-ideally to have a stable price
level. The second objective is to ensure a sustainable balance of
payments. This means that payments for imports from abroad or
payments of interest, dividends, or profits abroad should be made
without restriction.
With regard to inflation control, what is done in practice is the
following. At the Central Bank, close attention is paid to what is
happening in various crucial markets in the economy, especially
with a medium- and long-term perspective. Obviously, the first
area of focus is to look at the time-path of inflation itself; specifi-
cally, whether it is stable, accelerating, or decelerating. Attention
is also paid to what is happening with overall aggregate expendi-
ture in the economy, and, for this purpose, developments of key
indicators are analyzed. For example, we must look to the rate at
which imports are increasing and the rate at which the commercial
banks are giving credit, as well as to occurrences in the labor mar-
ket-that is to say, the tightness of the labor market must be deter-
mined. If the labor market is too tight, there may be pressures for
wages to increase, which will create cost-push inflation. There is
also a follow-up, of course, on developments in the financial and
foreign exchange markets.
Additionally, the Central Bank observes a set of indicators
that tell whether the economy is in a stable path or, for example, in
the process of overheating. If it becomes apparent that some
change in course is necessary, the instrument used for adjustment is
the interest rate on short-term debt issued by the Central Bank.
The Central Bank of Chile has an important amount of internal
debt through which it indirectly influences the market interest rate.
For example, if the interest rate paid in Central Bank notes is in-
creased, private banks will be willing to pay higher interest rates on
their deposits because they now have a risk-free asset that has a
better return in which to invest their reserves. Additionally, in the
process of increasing the interest paid on their deposits, private
banks will also increase the interest charged for their loans, given a
certain spread. This is the indirect way in which the Central Bank,
in this example, discourages overall aggregate expenditure by the
private sector. That is why I mentioned that the interest rate was
not totally free, in the sense that the Central Bank has some influ-
ence on it through its open market operations. Similarly, when the
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economy is slackening and there are no important inflationary
pressures, the interest rate can be reduced and the process thus
reversed. In a very simplified manner, this is the basic way in
which the monetary policy is implemented.
For balance of payments purposes, the principal instrument
used is the exchange rate. The Central Bank can intervene effi-
ciently in the foreign exchange market, given the size of the market
and the potential magnitude of the Central Bank intervention, and
influence the exchange rate. Therefore, there is one criterion for
the interest rate policy-inflation; and one criterion for the ex-
change rate policy-a sustainable balance of payments, although
neither criteria nor policy instruments are totally independent of
each other. To be more specific, having a sustainable balance of
payments creates an exchange rate that allows the current account
of the balance of payments to be financed by medium- and long-
term capital. That is, we are a country that needs savings from
abroad, and the way to get those foreign savings is by generating a
current account deficit. This means that we must import more than
we export. Yet, the amount at which we target the current account
deficit should be such that we are able to finance it with stable
medium- and long-term capital. We do not want to generate a situ-
ation where we have a huge current account deficit which we might
be able to finance for one or two years, but which we will be unable
to finance in the long run. In sum, our policy on the exchange rate
concerns a sustainable current account deficit, while our policy on
the interest rate concerns our role regarding inflation.
As a nation, we are aiming at maintaining and improving the
positive results we have obtained in the last seven to eight years in
the Chilean economy. This is a process in which we must keep
close track of developments because expectations, which are cru-
cial for investment decisions, may easily shift from a very good and
optimistic mood to a depressed one. Therefore, we tend to give
great weight to stability and try to avoid something that is flamboy-
ant and exciting, but lacks a solid foundation. We do believe that
stability and soundness are consistent with a dynamic economic be-
havior. The idea is to have a dynamic economy that can be sus-
tained through time.
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V. CONCLUSION
As to the current state of the Chilean economy, we have com-
pleted the thirty-seventh quarter of uninterrupted growth. This is
something quite outstanding when you compare it with Chile's his-
tory, other countries in the region, and even other countries
outside the region. Last year, the GDP increased by 10.4% in real
terms, and, in the last eight years, the average increase in the GDP
has been 6%. Unemployment in Chile today is at 4.4%. This is the
lowest figure in twenty years-really since statistics have been
available. Hence, we are near a full employment situation. As
mentioned earlier, exports of goods and services represent nearly
35% of the GDP. In 1982, it was only 20% of the GDP. Further-
more, external debt has fallen from more than 100% of our GDP
in 1985 to 1987, to less than 50% today. This is another clear indi-
cator of the improving foreign sector situation of the Chilean econ-
omy. Foreign interest payments have fallen from 35% of total
exports between 1985 and 1987, to less than 10% currently. In
1982, Chilean international reserves represented 15% of the coun-
try's external debt. Today, they represent 49% of external debt
and more than one year of imports of goods. This also shows the
solid position of our external situation.
A very interesting development in Chile's economy is that we
have a fiscal budget surplus of approximately 2% of the GDP. This
is also quite atypical for a developing country, and even for a de-
veloped country today. It should also be mentioned that Chileans,
for the first time in many years, are investing abroad. In the last
two years, we have invested more than 500 million dollars, mainly
in Argentina and Peru, which are countries that are undergoing
structural reforms and have gone into privatization of their public
enterprises. The savings rate in Chile has also increased from less
than 10% between 1982 and 1986 to nearly 20% last year. The
investment rate has increased from 10% in the early 1980s to more
than 20% last year. Annual inflation has fallen in the last three
years from 27% to less than 13%. Thus, when you look at all the
macroeconomic indicators in the Chilean economy for the last six
or seven years, you really find what I would call a successful case of
macroeconomic management.
I would like to conclude by saying that we are naturally quite
happy with these results and are very conscious of our responsibili-
ties in maintaining and improving them. This is very crucial be-
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cause once you achieve certain results and obtain certain levels of
welfare, people sometimes forget about the effort, responsibility,
and care that lie behind those results, thus taking them for granted.
In Chile, there is a considerable increase in consumer spending
right now, because the economic situation is relatively good. In-
vestment, employment, and real wages have also been increasing,
and, thus, domestic spending is boosting aggregate demand. This
could complicate further improvements in the struggle with infla-
tion. This, of course, is a matter of great concern.
Chile has numerous challenges for the future, such as reducing
poverty, improving the quality of its labor force, dealing with envi-
ronmental issues, reforming government, and improving regulation
without jeopardizing the benefits of competition. Another chal-
lenge relates to the need for maintaining and increasing the rate of
investment. Chile has an investment rate above 20%, which is high
for both Chilean and Latin-American standards generally, but still
low if we expect to steadily increase the rate of output growth to
reach sustainable levels of approximately 7% per year. Therefore,
if we really want to leave under-development behind us, create
conditions for improvement of the population on a more stable ba-
sis, obtain a higher stage of welfare, and hopefully become a devel-
oped country, the major macroeconomic challenge we face is to
further increase savings and investment. This is something that re-
quires time, patience, and constancy. These are scarce resources in
many countries. The overall goal of maintaining and improving a
stable, efficient, and dynamic macroeconomic framework, which is
a necessary condition for increasing savings and investment, is the
major challenge we will face in the upcoming years.
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